More from an overview of articles on US defense strategy showed up in my newsfeed, and the summaries of the content make for interesting assertions.

Main point: The essays being summarized sought to “ponder the equally important ‘unknown unknowns’ and, insofar as this is possible, to characterize potential U.S. national security weaknesses and the threats most likely to blindside the U.S. and its allies…to make them ‘known unknowns,’ as it were.”

More about it:

  • “…the U.S. must integrate the U.S. Space Force into its revitalized efforts to compete with China.”
  • “…logistics is the most significant asymmetric advantage of the U.S. military, even if it is rarely appreciated as such.”
  • “…with the end of the Cold War the U.S. put away nuclear concerns, suggesting the U.S. is overdue in making adequate preparations in the realm of civil defense in anticipation of this and other potential threats.”
  • “…the U.S. military needs a new mindset for thinking about complex problems. If the traditional, analytical approach to planning is rendered irrelevant, what should drive the paradigm replacing our legacy methods?”
  • “…low-intensity conflict could occur in the future against increasingly competent actors for which the U.S. may be unprepared based on its extant doctrine.”

Why it matters: “The scholarly obsession in the United States with centering the United States is stunning our ability to analyze foreign affairs, leading too many of us to assume the United States can influence everything.”